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Abstract
The unique characteristics of a mobile ad hoc net-
work (MANET), such as dynamic topology, shared wireless
medium and open peer-to-peer network architecture, pose
various security challenges. This paper compares three
routing protocols, DSDV, DSR, and AODV under security
attack where two types of node misbehaviour have been in-
vestigated. Network performance is evaluated in terms of
normalized throughput, routing overhead, normalized rout-
ing load, and average packet delay, when a percentage of
nodes misbehave. Simulation results show that although the
performance of all three routing protocols degrades, DSDV
is the most robust routing protocol under security attacks.
This reveals that a proactive routing protocol has the poten-
tial of excluding misbehaving nodes in advance and reduc-
ing the impact of security attack.
Keywords—wireless ad hoc networks, routing protocols,
security attack
1 Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) consists of a col-
lection of wireless mobile nodes that are capable of com-
municating with each other without the use of any central-
ized administration or network infrastructure. The routing
protocols in an ad hoc network should be able to cope well
with dynamically changing topology, and nodes should ex-
change information on the topology of the network in or-
der to establish routes. This brings about the issue of se-
curity in an ad hoc network. Using the wireless links in
MANETs, any security gained because of the difficulty of
tapping into a wired network is lost since the topology of
MANETs is highly dynamic and traditional routing proto-
cols can no longer be used. Due to the dynamic network
topology, different packets exchanged between the same two
nodes may go through different routes, among which there
may be attackers lurking. It is also difficult to authenticate
each node of a MANET unlike in a wired network, because
of the absence of online servers [4]. Common security at-
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tacks include replay attack, denial of Service (DoS), mod-
ification, masquerading, routing table overflow, imperson-
ation, energy consumption, and so on [2]. Some secure rout-
ing protocols have been proposed to protect routing mes-
sages and prevent attackers from either modifying these
messages or injecting harmful routing messages into the net-
work [4, 6, 7, 10].
A simulation-based analysis of security exposures in
MANETs was carried out by Michiardi and Molva [5] where
it is assumed that a node may misbehave under the above
security attacks. Three types of routing misbehaviour have
been classified and simulated within the dynamic routing
protocol (DSR) [3]. Their simulation results showed that
network operation and maintenance can be easily jeopar-
dized and network performance severely affected. The ob-
jective of this paper is to extend this work to compare the
performance under security attack of DSR with two other
well-known ad hoc routing protocols: DSDV (Destination
Sequenced Distance Vector) [8], and AODV (Ad hoc on De-
mand Distance Vector Routing) [9]. The performance of
these routing protocols when security is not of concern has
been extensively studied and compared previously [1]. It
is interesting to see how robust each routing protocol’s ap-
proach is against security attack.
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 briefly introduces the
above three routing protocols and discusses the two types
of routing misbehaviour. Section 3 describes the simulation
environment and methodology in ns2. Section 4 presents
the simulation results and discussion and finally, Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Routing Protocols and Routing Behaviours
  	 

Routing protocols in MANETs are classified as table
driven or on-demand. Table driven protocols are proactive,
because they attempt to maintain consistent up-to-date in-
formation. On demand routing protocols are also known
as reactive protocols which are source-initiated and create
routes only when desired by a node. This paper compares
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one table driven routing protocol: DSDV and two prominent
on-demand routing protocols: DSR and AODV.
DSDV: This routing protocol is a table-driven algorithm
based on the Bellman-Ford routing mechanism. To avoid
routing loops, every mobile node in the network maintains a
routing table in which all of the possible destinations within
the network and the number of hops to each destination are
recorded. Entries are marked with a sequence number as-
signed by the destination node. The sequence numbers en-
able the mobile nodes to distinguish stale routes from new
ones, thereby avoiding the formation of routing loops.
DSR: This is a simple and efficient routing protocol com-
posed of two mechanisms, route discovery and route main-
tenance, which work together to allow nodes discover and
maintain source routes to arbitrary destinations in the ad
hoc network. The source node uses Route Discovery to
find a route when a request arrives and inserts the discov-
ered routes in the packet header. Intermediate nodes do not
need to maintain up-to-date routing information apart from
participation in the route discovery and maintenance.
AODV: The AODV routing protocol is an improvement
on DSDV because it typically minimizes the number of re-
quired broadcasts by creating routes on a demand basis, as
opposed to maintaining a complete list of routes as in the
DSDV algorithm. The authors of AODV classify it as a pure
on-demand route acquisition system, since nodes that are not
on a selected path do not maintain routing information or
participate in routing table exchanges. When a source node
desires to send a message to some destination node and does
not already have a valid route to that destination, it initiates
a path discovery process to locate the other node.
   	 
Misbehaviour of nodes has been used to distinguish net-
works that are under security attack. Previous work has
pointed out two types of misbehaviour: a selfish behaviour
and a malicious behaviour [5]. Selfish nodes use the network
but do not cooperate, saving battery life for their own com-
munications: they do not intend to directly damage other
nodes. Malicious nodes aim at damaging other nodes by
causing network outage by partitioning while saving battery
life is not a priority. This paper focuses on the misbehaviour
model for selfish nodes and based on [5] defines two differ-
ent type models for them. Node selfishness is of great inter-
est because nodes of MANETs are often battery-powered,
thus energy is a precious resource that they may not want to
waste for the benefit of other nodes. All together we define
three routing behaviours of nodes.
1) Type 0 well-behaved node: Nodes behave nicely
according to a routing protocol including route discovery,
maintenance, packet forwarding and receiving.
2) Type 1 selfish node: In this model, a selfish node does
not perform packet forwarding, so every packet sent to this
node is dropped by it. Thus, it disables the packet forward-
ing function for all packets that have a source address or
a destination address different from the current selfish node
address. This actually helps the selfish node in terms of con-
sumed energy to save a significant portion of its battery life
by neglecting large data packets, while still contributing to
the network maintenance.
3) Type 2 selfish node: In this model, the node does noth-
ing with the packet sent to it, thereby no execution func-
tion is performed. The selfish node can be considered as a
rest node inside the network, since it stops contributing to
the network maintenance, routing discovery, nor packet for-
warding and receiving.
We believe that these selfishness models are simple, but
realistic. Our following simulation study evaluates the per-
formance of DSDV, DSR and AODV when a certain per-
centage of nodes behave following the Type 1 and Type 2
selfishness models above, while the remaining nodes are as-
sumed to be well-behaved.
3 Simulation Environment and Methodology
ns2 provides a good platform for MANET simulation. It
contains models and modules at physical and data link lay-
ers, medium access control protocols, and the ad hoc routing
protocols we want to compare (DSDV, DSR and AODV).
The node movement scenario allows a node to choose its
destination and moves towards it at a uniform speed. This
is called the random waypoint model. When a node reaches
its destination it waits for a pause time before choosing a
random destination and repeating the process. Communi-
cations among randomly selected nodes are established us-
ing constant bit rate (CBR) traffic. The above node misbe-
haviours have been added as separate node definition types
in the ns2 node model, which allows selection of selfishness
model between two possible choices. Using the ns2 envi-
ronment, some common parameters are listed in Table 1.
Parameters Values
Area 1000m x 1000m
Radio range 250 m
Link capacity 2 Mbps
Pause time 5 seconds
Simulation time 200 seconds
Buffer size 50 packets
Application Constant bit rate (CBR) traffic
Packet size 512 bytes
Table 1. Fixed parameters in simulation
Apart from the above fixed parameters, we design the
simulations by changing certain aspects of MANETs in or-
der to evaluate the network performance of routing protocols
under security attack. As summarised in Table 2, the aspects
are as follows:
Network Density: This aspect is represented by the num-
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Parameters Values
Network density high (60 nodes) / low (20 nodes)
Network mobility high (15 m/s) / low (2m/s)
Routing protocols DSDV / DSR / AODV
Types of selfish node Type 1 / Type 2
Percentage of SNs 0-50%
Table 2. Variable parameters in simulation
ber of nodes in a fixed area where an MANET is run. Two
kinds of densities are considered: high density refers to the
usage of 60 nodes in an area of 1000m x 1000m, and low
density 20 nodes in the same area. The denseness of a node
in a MANET would influence the performance of the routing
protocols used in the network. Thus, it should be expected
that an increased density of nodes in the network would de-
crease the routing protocols performance as a direct effect of
less bandwidth and higher congestion but might also reduce
the deleterious effect of selfish nodes.
Network Mobility: Two types of network mobility sce-
narios are simulated. Within a high mobility network, all
nodes move with a maximum speed of 15 m/s while within
a low mobility network, all nodes move with a maximum
speed of 2 m/s. The performance of routing protocols will
be worse under high network mobility.
Routing protocols: Three types of ad hoc routing proto-
cols are used: DSDV, DSR and AODV.
Types of selfish nodes: As described in the last Section,
two types of selfish nodes are simulated: Type 1 and Type
2. It is expected that Type 1 selfish node may degrade the
network more than Type 2 as it participates in routing dis-
covery and maintenance but refuses to forward packet when
it is included in a route.
Percentage of selfish nodes: The network will suffer
more when more well-behaved nodes are compromised to
selfish nodes. The number of selfish nodes is presented by
percentage, from 0% to 50%. The remaining nodes are as-
sumed to be well-behaved.
 
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In comparing the protocols, network performance is eval-
uated according to the following metrics:
Normalized throughput: Also called packet delivery ra-
tio in [1] and throughput in [5], this is the ratio of the number
of packets received by the CBR sink to the number of pack-
ets sent by the CBR source, both at the application layer.
Packets that are sent but not received are lost in the network
due to malicious drops, route failures, congestion, and wire-
less channel losses.
Average delay: This is the average delay of all the pack-
ets that are correctly received. Lost packets are obviously
not included in this measurement since their packet delay is
infinity.
Routing overhead: The total number of routing packets
transmitted during the simulation at the network layer. Pack-
ets that are routed over multiple hops are counted multiple
times – each hop is counted as one transmission.
Normalized routing load: The ratio of the total number
of routing packets transmitted or forwarded at the network
layer to the total number of CBR packets received at the
destination at the application layer.
These metrics together give a thorough evaluation of a
routing protocol. Normalized throughput represents both the
completeness and correctness of the routing protocol; aver-
age packet delay tells efficiency of the protocol to correctly
deliver packets and the degree of network congestion; rout-
ing overhead measures the scalability of the routing protocol
and its power consumption efficiency; and normalized rout-
ing load demonstrates to some extend the average number
of hops the protocol routes a packet from sender to receiver,
as well as the efficiency of the protocol.
4 Simulation Results and Analysis
In this paper, only simulation results of network with low
node density are presented and discussed. Figures 1, 2, 3,
and 4 demonstrate the results of normalized throughput, av-
erage delay, routing overhead and normalized overhead of
networks with low node density, low / high node mobility,
and Type 1 / Type 2 selfish nodes. Overall, DSR and AODV
suffer a lot from the two types of selfish nodes, while DSDV
shows constant performance under security attack although
its performance also degrades. We do not compare the per-
formance between Type 1 and Type 2 selfish nodes since our
interest is in comparing the routing protocols.
  	
Fig. 1 presents the normalized throughput of DSDV, DSR
and AODV, with low node density, low / high node mobil-
ity, and increasing percentage of selfish nodes of Type 1 and
Type 2. In a low mobility network, when there is no self-
ish nodes in the network, DSR and AODV achieve higher
throughput (i.e., deliver around 80% of the offered load)
than DSDV (which delivers just about 60% of the offered
load) (see Figs. 1a and 1b). The throughput of all the three
protocols declines when the percentage of selfish nodes in-
creases. In a high mobility network, the impact of selfish
nodes in DSDV throughput is not very strong with a quite
constant value between 10% to 30% normalized throughput
(see Figs. 1c and 1d). On the other hand, the normalized
throughput of AODV and DSR drops quickly: for AODV
from about 70% to about 10%, and for DSR from about 60%
to about 10%.
This is because the selfish nodes in the network do not co-
operate well in the protocols as well-behaved nodes: Type
1 nodes do not forward packets for other nodes while Type
2 nodes do not participate in any routing activity. As a re-
sult, the network malfunctions, with decreasing efficiency of
packet delivery.
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Fig. 2 shows the average packet delay of DSDV, DSR and
AODV with low node density, low / high node mobility, and
increasing percentage of selfish nodes of Type 1 and Type
2. The impacts of selfish nodes on delay for the protocols
are not very obvious, apart from an increase trend for DSR
under low mobility with Type 2 selfish node (see Fig. 2b),
and for AODV under high mobility with Type 2 selfish node
(see Fig. 2d).
What is observed instead is that DSR always has a higher
average packet delay among the three protocols and DSDV
the lowest with or without selfish nodes. This is because
DSR needs time to find a route on demand of the source, or
when the link breakage happens; while DSDV is a proactive
routing protocol and finds route periodically, thereby a route
is ready when a packet is required to be sent, reducing the
packet delay. As a combination of DSR and DSDV, AODV
results in a modest packet delay in the middle, as shown in
Figs. 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d.
 	 "
Fig. 3 shows the routing overhead of DSDV, DSR and
AODV with low node density, low / high node mobility, and
increasing percentage of selfish nodes of Type 1 and Type 2.
In the low mobility case, the routing overhead of AODV
decreases quickly from about 45000 packets when there is
no selfish nodes to about 15000 packets when there is 10%
of selfish nodes (see Figs 3a and 3b), and then drops less
severely when the percentage of selfish nodes increases. A
similar trend is observed for DSR. This is because as the
normalized throughput of DSR and AODV suffers from the
selfish nodes (see Fig. 1), more packets are dropped in the
network thus requiring less routing overhead. In contrast,
DSDV keeps a approximately constant overhead regardless
the existence of selfish nodes and how many of them. This is
because DSDV is table-driven with relatively stable routing
control overhead, as also observed in Fig. 1 that the normal-
ized throughput of DSDV changes less than those of DSR
and AODV.
In the high mobility case, again the overhead of DSR and
AODV decreases with the increase of selfish nodes but that
of DSDV is approximately constant (see Fig. 3c and 3d).
  	 #
Fig. 4 shows the normalized routing load of DSDV, DSR
and AODV with low node density, low / high node mobil-
ity, and increasing percentage of selfish nodes of Type 1 and
Type 2. No constant trend is observed for AODV. For exam-
ple, with low mobility, apart from when there is no selfish
node, the normalized routing load of AODV shows an in-
crease trend with the increase of Type 1 selfish nodes (see
Fig. 4a), but this trend does not hold with the increase of
Type 2 selfish nodes (see Fig. 4b), nor with the high mobil-
ity case (see Figs. 4c and 4d). No obvious trend is observed
for DSR either. For DSDV, there is a slightly increase trend
of normalized routing load with the increase of selfish nodes
(Figs. 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d). This means that packets travel
through more hops to reach destinations when more nodes
are compromised.
Another observation is that AODV normally has the high-
est normalized routing load among the three protocols and
DSDV the least with or without selfish nodes. This shows
that DSDV is the best in finding routes optimal to the short-
est paths.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper compares three routing protocols, DSDV,
DSR, and AODV under security attack. Network perfor-
mance is evaluated in terms of normalized throughput, aver-
age packet delay, routing overhead and normalized routing
load, when a percentage of nodes behave selfishly. Simula-
tion results show that although the performance of all three
routing protocols degrades, DSDV is the most robust routing
protocol under security attack. This reveals that a proactive
routing protocol has the potential of excluding misbehav-
ing nodes in advance and reducing the impact of security
attacks. In the future, we will compare the performance of
routing protocols with different types of selfish nodes in a
bigger area with longer simulation time with different node
pause time. We will also study the robustness of DSDV and
find a way of detecting misbehaving nodes in MANETs.
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       Figure 1.a: Throughput for low mobility, Type 1.             Figure 1.b: Throughput for low mobility, Type 2. 
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       Figure 1.c: Throughput for high mobility, Type 1.          Figure 1.d: Throughput for high mobility, Type 2.  
Figure 1: Normalized throughput under the low density, low mobility case, and the low density, high mobility 
 case, with increasing percentage of selfish nodes of Type 1 and Type 2. 
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      Figure 2.a: Average delay for low mobility, Type 1.        Figure 2.b: Average delay for low mobility, Type 2. 
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      Figure 2.c: Average delay for high mobility, Type 1.     Figure 2.d: Average delay for high mobility, Type 2. 
Figure 2: Average packet delay under the low density, low mobility case, and the low density, high mobility case, 
with increasing percentage of selfish nodes of Type 1 and Type 2. 
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Figure 3.a: Routing overhead for low mobility, Type 1.    Figure 3.b: Routing overhead for low mobility, Type 2. 
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Figure 3.c: Routing overhead for high mobility, Type 1.   Figure 3.d: Routing overhead for high mobility, Type 2. 
Figure 3: Routing overhead under the low density, low mobility case, and the low density, high mobility case, 
with increasing percentage of selfish nodes of Type 1 and Type 2. 
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  Figure 4.a: Normalized routing load          Figure 4.b: Normalized routing load 
                     for low mobility, Type 1.                                                     for low mobility 1, Type 2. 
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               Figure 4.c: Normalized routing load     Figure 4.d: Normalized routing load 
                     for high mobility, Type 1.      for high mobility, Type 2. 
Figure 4: Normalized routing load under the low density, low mobility case, and the low density, high mobility 
case, with increasing percentage of selfish nodes of Type 1 and Type 2. 
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